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REFLECTIONS ON BRUSSELS:
IMCO AND THE 1969 POLLUTION CONVENTIONS
Dennis M. O'Connell
"It is the top of the ninth inning. Man, always a threat at the plate,
has been hitting Nature hard. It is important to remember, however,
that NATURE BATS LAST."f
In the world of the sea, impulsiveness is left to nature; man gives
longer thought to his actions.*
Which of these characterizations ultimately proves accurate has, in
recent years, become more than an academic question. The dramatic
rise in the number of maritime or offshore incidents resulting in oil
spillage has prompted widespread concern over the future of the living
resources of the seas and over secondary effects on the greater environ-
ment. Optimism regarding the deliberateness of mankind in resolving
such problems is a sentiment apropos of the adoption at Brussels, under
the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (IMCO), of two new conventions dealing with pollution of the
seas by oil. Whether these and other measures will be adequate and time-
ly enough to stay the predictions of the "doomsday" ecologists is yet to
be seen.
-Anonymous - quoted by Dr. Paul Ehrlich in Eco-Catastrophe!, RAMPARTS, Sept.
1969, 24, at 28.
*Jean Roullier, Secretary-General, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, Foreword to 8 N. SINGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF MERCHANT SHIP-
ING at vi (British Shipping Laws 1963) [hereinafter cited as SHIPPING CONVENTIONS].
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I. BACKGROUND - THE ROLE OF IMCO
No discussion of international efforts to domesticate the pollution
problem could properly omit reference to the contributions made by
IMCO in its brief history. The Organization of sixty-nine member states
is a product of more than half a century of international efforts to facili-
tate cooperation in maritime matters.' Forces seeking to institutionalize
such cooperation coalesced at the United Nations Maritime Conference
in 19482 which convened to "consider the establishment of an inter-
governmental maritime organization. ' 3 Thirty-two nations participated
and produced the "Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization" 4 which came into force in 1958.
The purposes of IMCO were directed largely to problems of removal
of discrimination in shipping and other restrictive practices. However,
the Organization was also to:
provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field
of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters
of all kinds affecting shipping . . . [and]
[t]o provide for the consideration by the Organization of any matters
concerning shipping that may be referred to it by . . . the United
Nations.5
Although the purposes of IMCO are broad, its functions are "consultative
and advisory" - it is neither a legislative body as such nor a regulatory
agency.6 Despite general support for the consultative purposes, there has
been resistance to IMCO activity beyond technical matters. For example,
a number of states have adhered to the Convention with reservations
relating to the provisions condemning restrictive practices.7 IMCO policy
1. See C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 430-36 (6th rev. ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as COLOMBOS]; Mann, The Problem of Sea Water Pollution, 29
DEP'T STATE BULL. 775 (1953); Shepheard & Mann, Reducing the Menace of Oil Pollu-
tion, 31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 31 (1954) (This "after-action" report of the U.S. delegation
to the 1954 London Conference indicates that U.S. shipowners intended to comply with
the 1954 Convention, note 14 infra, even absent U.S. ratification.); 35 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 521 (1956); 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 304 (1961) (statement advocating U.S. accession
to the 1954 Convention); 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 776 (1961) (statement of the Legal
Adviser of the Dep't of State urging U.S. ratification to gain bargaining power for U.S.
proposals at the 1961 Conference) ; notes 2, 13 infra.
2. McDonald, Toward a World Maritime Organization (pts. 1-2), 18 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 99, 131 (1948); U.S. Delegation to Conference on Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation, id. 286; Cates, United Nations Maritime Conference, id. 495; United Nations
Maritime Conference, Final Act and Related Documents (1948).
3. Id. at 7.
4. Hereinafter cited as IMCO Convention, done at Geneva, March 6, 1948 [1958]
U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 3.
5. IMCO Convention, 1 (a), (d).
6. Id., art. 2.
7. 13 N. SINGH & R. COLINVAUX, SHIPOWNERS 129 (British Shipping Laws 1967).
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has apparently been more liberal than that of other agencies in accepting
memberships subject to reservations.8 The diversity of interests among
maritime states explains this phenomenon at least in part. Similarly,
ship-owning states, oil-producing states, cargo-owning states, and "home-
lands of the free" providing flags of convenience can be expected to view
new oil pollution measures with differing degrees of enthusiasm. 9 These
conflicts have yielded a prediction that "there appears to be little future
for IMCO save in the technical field."10 However, it must be remembered
that the Organization is an advisory and consultative body and that its
objectives are not present absolutes but goals to guide efforts." Its ex-
pertise and continuity tend to facilitate the resolution of problems more
effectively than would ad hoc bodies or meetings.' 2 However, despite its
importance, IMCO is the smallest of the United Nations specialized
agencies and has a very limited budget.' 3
IMCO activities in the pollution field must be viewed against the back-
drop of earlier efforts. The most significant of these was the agreement
at London in 1954 on the International Convention on the Pollution
of the Sea by Oil.14 After its formation in 1958, IMCO assumed respon-
sibility from the United Kingdom for study, supervision, and proposals
8. T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
28, 29 and n. 65 (1969).
9. IMCO's first "constitutional crisis" involved such flags of convenience. The Mari-
time Safety Committee, a major organ of IMCO was to consist of representatives,
inter alia, of the "eight largest ship-owning nations." States with large registered fleets
argued that membership was to be based on tonnage registered by the state. This
claim was upheld by the International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion of 8 June
1960, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 150. The opinions of the parties provide good coverage of the
"flag of convenience" problem. I.C.J. Pleadings, Constitution of the Maritime Safety
Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Advisory
Opinion, supra) (1960); see COLOaBos 442-43.
10. 13 N. SINGH & R. COLINVAUX, supra note 7, at 130.
11. id. at 364.
12. COLOIMBos 442.
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1968, at 80, col. 3. By 1968, the membership had grown to
sixty-nine nations. Id. The 1964-65 annual budget was $1,459,370. Y.B. oF THE UNITED
NATIONS 568 (1964>. For a general description of IMCO, see id. at 567-69 and suc-
cessive yearbooks of the U.N. from 1959 (describing the first full year of operations);
D. Bowarr, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 106-08, 111-14 (1963); CoLoMiBos
441-43; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 83942 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as McDoUGAL & BURKE]; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1014-
18 (8th ed. H. LAUTERPACHT ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]; Water Pollu-
tion - 1967, pt. 1, Hearing on S. 1591 and S. 1604 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 and
passim (1967) [hereinafter cited as Water Pollution - 1967].
14. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter cited as 1954 Convention]; Amendments to id, adopted by Conference
of Contracting Governments at London, April 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S.
No. 6109. The Final Acts of the 1954 and 1961 conferences with the Convention and
amendments are reprinted in SHIPPING CONVENTIONS 1158-87.
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for revision of the Convention. 4' The 1954 Convention essentially for-
bids dumping or spillage of oil or oily mixtures from ships registered by
Parties within 50 miles of any shore.' 5 The 1962 amendments expand the
classes of ships covered and broaden the prohibited zones to as much as
150 miles in heavily traveled sea lanes.16 The 1962 agreement provides
for inspection of oil record books which theoretically record all spillages
permitted by the Convention (e.g. to save life at sea, mixtures sufficiently
diluted with sea water, etc.). However, inspections may be conducted
only in a port of one of the ,Contracting Parties. Enforcement of all pro-
visions remains with the state of flag.'7 It is important to note that the
prohibited zones are not "contiguous zones" in the sense of affording a
basis for coastal state police power over offending vessels within them.'
s
14A. SHIPPING CONVENTIONS 1157-58.
15. "This is a nice round lawyer's figure which might be extended further or re-
vised to reflect some facts of nature." THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 22, 1967, at 5. For a
discussion and similar criticism of the 1954 Convention and 1962 amendments, see E.
DU PONTAVICE, LA POLLUTION DES MERS PAR LES HYDROCARBURES 92-101 (1968).
[D]ans l'ttat actuel de nos connaissances des courants marins. . . . rlen ne
permet de dire que les eaux pollutes ne vont pas 6tre conduites par les
courants, A la c6te.
Id. at 99.
16. Several of the Contracting Parties have enacted legislation implementing the
terms of the treaty:
U.S.: Oil Pollution Act of 1961, 33 U.S.C. §§1001-15 (1964).
U.K.: [Early legislation in the U.K., the 1922 Oil in Navigable Waters Act (12 & 13
Geo. V, c. 39) was of limited value to claimants. In Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport
Corporation, [1956] A.C. 218, the House of Lords held shipowners liable only for negli-
gence.] The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. II, ch. 25) amended in
1963 (Eliz. II, 1963, ch. 28) brought the Convention into force for the U.K. See
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND CIVIL AVIATION, MANUAL ON THE AVOIDANCE OF POLLUTION
OF THE SEA BY OIL (1958) for maps of zones, text of the Act, and regulations; see also
CoLoMBOs 433-35.
France: The French enacted legislation establishing a zone of surveillance and im-
posing fines and penalties for violations. DU PONTAVICE, supra note 15, at 101-06.
17. The state of flag theoretically offers a responsible party for enforcement of
"community policies" for control of pollution. It may, by agreement, be made responsi-
ble for promulgation and enforcement of regulations. McDOUGAL & BURKE 1089. This
is the theory upon which the 1954 Convention proceeds.
However, a state which has no greater nexus with a vessel than that of a "licensing
office" or mailbox may be a dubious vehicle for vigorous prosecution of community
interests. Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 316, 331 (1969). Move-
ment toward a "genuine link" concept of nationality of ships may provide more
responsible state governance of ships carrying pollutants, Convention on the High Seas
done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, (effective
September 30, 1962) art. 5.
18. Whether such authority existed was a matter of some confusion in tie 1967
water pollution hearings. Water Pollution - 1967, 11, 12, 19 (jurisdiction over foreign-
flag vessels outside U.S. territorial waters), 206 (possibility of imposition of liability
under U.S. laws within the zones), 207 (conclusion that jurisdiction of U.S. was con-
fined to the three-mile limit). A report of government lawyers preparing for an IMCO
session in 1967 found no authority for such jurisdiction beyond territorial waters ex-
cept, e.g., admiralty and criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals, certain customs
authority, and rights to the continental shelf. Id. at 207.
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Therefore, the Convention does not justify the kind of state action which
prompted the 1969 Brussels Conference.
II. THE WORK OF THE 1969 CONFERENCE
GENERAL
The catalysts which generated one of the central issues before the Con-
ference were the wreck of the oil tanker, Torrey Canyon, which resulted
in damage to public and private interests in Britain and France, and the
bombing of the wreck by the British to set it afire.19 To resolve the am-
biguity surrounding its rights against the vessel under international
law,20 Great Britain once again invoked international consultative
machinery to devise new anti-pollution measures.21 In response, IMCO an-
nounced that it would take under study the issues of coastal state protec-
tive measures and vessel liability with a view to drafting a new treaty to
deal with the oil problem.
22
IMCO, which had done continuing work in the field through its Sub-
committee on Oil Pollution 23 referred the matter to its newly created
However, it has been recommended that the U.S. extend its pollution legislation
to the contiguous zone defined in the 1958 Convention (Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone done April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective September 10, 1964); see text at note 54 infra).
SECRETARIES OF INTERIOR & TRANSPORTATION, A REPORT ON POLLUTION OF THE NATION'S
WATERS BY OIL AND OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 26 (1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT]. The proposal is embodied in pending oil pollution legislation; see
S 544, infra note 107, §12(a>(ll) (6).
19. The sequence of events has been thoroughly rehearsed elsewhere: Nanda, The
"Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENvER L.J. 400 (1967) ; Sweeney,
Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FoRDIAm L. REv. 155, 157-58 (1968); Utton, Protective
Measures and the "Torrey Canyon," 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 613, 613-17 (1968);
Note, Continental Shelf Oil Disasters: Challenge To International Pollution Control,
55 CORNELL L. Rav. 113, 117-18 (1969).
20. Utton, supra note 19. at 617, 619, n. 44; Note, supra note 19, at 122. R. NEUMAN,
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONFERENCE
ON MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
21. The United Kingdom called a special meeting of IMCO to discuss the dilemma
confronting a state when a ship sinks outside territorial waters but harms national
interests. WATER CONTROL NEws, April 17, 1967, at 9.
22. Issues other than state action were coverage of chemical pollutants and coopera-
tion with the International Labor Organization (I.L.O. to improve the seamanship of
tanker officers. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1968, at 80, col. 3. Later the controversial proposal
to permit the sinking of a polluting wreck on the high seas was announced in con-
junction with a special assembly called for November 1969. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1968,
at 91, col. 3; CONFERENCE REPORT 2. At the time, it was also suggested that the coastal
state be able to enact regulations to "prevent, mitigate, or eliminate" pollution of its
shores. Ratification of the proposed conventions was expected to require about three
years. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1968, §5, at 15, col. 1.
23. A U.S. study suggests the dominant international aspect of oil pollution:
First, accidental or deliberate spills which threaten American coasts may occur
outside the United States territorial waters. Despite this fact, the United States
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Legal Committee which, with assistance from the Comit6 Maritime In-
ternational (C.M.I.),24 drafted two proposed treaties. 25 The Final Act 20
of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage
which met in Brussels, from 10-29 November 1969, opened two conven-
tions for signature and accession: "The International Convention Re-
lating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casual-
ties" [the "Public Law Convention"] 27 and "The International Con-
vention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage" [the "Civil Lia-
bility Convention"]. 28
A. THE PUBLIC LAW CONVENTION
1. Content
The preamble to the Public Law Convention states that the Con-
tracting Parties are conscious of the pollution threat to sea and coast-
must be able to act quickly against a threat that develops in international
waters so that we may take whatever immediate preventive or remedial steps
are necessary.
Secondly, vessels which discharge oil may be outside the registry of an affected
coastal national and thus not be within the direct and simple application of its
laws.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2.
24. For a discussion of the formation, purposes, and activities of the C.M.I., see 13
N. SINGH & R. COLINVAUX, supra note 7, at 154-68; SHIPPING CONVENTIONS 1274-75.
25. CONFERENCE REPORT 1; Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution -
Domestic and International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 27 (1969). The draft of the
public law convention was prepared exclusively by the IMCO Legal Committee (Id.
at 28; IMCO LEG 111/2, June 18, 1968); the second draft convention apparently was
a hybrid of a C.M.I. draft and another draft prepared jointly by IMCO and C.M.I.
Comment, supra note 17, at 334. Movement of IMCO into the private law area of
liability is a new step as this was ground previously occupied almost exclusively by
the C.M.I. Mendelsohn, supra, at 28.
26. IMCO, Final Act of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution
Damage [hereinafter cited as Final Act], 1969, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 20-67 (1970).
Fifty-four nations participated in the Conference, 48 by official delegations. Three
specialized agencies of the U.N. were present as well as six non-governmental bodies
such as the C.M.I. and the International Chamber of Shipping. CONFERENCE REPORT
3, 5.
The U.S. delegation consisted of representatives from the Legal Adviser's Office of
the State Department, the Department of Interior and the Coast Guard. Advisers to
the delegation were the Vice-President of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping
(A.I.M.S.) and the President of the Maritime Law Association of the United States.
Id. at 5. Both of the latter offered critical testimony in opposition to domestic oil pollu-
tion legislation. See generally Water Pollution - 1967; Water Pollution - 1969; pt. 1,
Hearings on S.7 and S.544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Water
Pollution - 1969]. The U.S. official position on the civil liability draft incorporated
the view of the State Department that there should be absolute liability with a $25
million ceiling. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1969, at 98, col. 2. The makeup of the delegation
led to the inevitability of a split on this issue. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1969, at 93, col. 4.
Ralph E. Casey, speaking for the A.I.M.S. on the eve of his departure for Brussels said
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line and are "[convinced] that under these circumstances measures of
an exceptional character to protect such interests might be necessary on
the high seas and that these measures do not affect the principle of free-
dom of the seas." 29 Article I, the heart of the Convention, is the Con-
ference's formulation of this principle of self-protection. Paragraph 1 of
Article I provides:
Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high
seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and
imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution
or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime
casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.
In accordance with the principle of sovereign immunity, no such
actions may be taken against warships or ships owned or operated by a
state in non-commercial service.
Significantly, the Convention is limited in its application to incidents
involving a "ship." The term encompasses its usual meaning of a "sea-
going vessel" as well as "any floating craft." However, the latter definition
is qualified so as to exclude oil rigs conducting drilling operations on the
continental shelf, an area of increasing concern for pollution incidents. 30
that the shipping industry remained "vehemently opposed" to the State Department's
position on strict liability for pollution damage. Id.
27. Final Act, Attachment 1, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT'Ls 25 (1970).
28. Id., Attachment 2, at 45.
29. Preamble, Public Law Convention.
30. It does not include -
an installation or device engaged in the exploration and exploitation of the
resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.
Id., art. II, para. 2 (b).
It has been suggested that IMCO consider the international aspects of pollution from
coastal state operations on the continental shelf. Note, supra note 19, 126-28. The
Organization's abstinence from this endeavor at Brussels may be a consequence of
"constitutional" limitations. The IMCO Convention provides for IMCO activity in the
field of shipping. See note 4 supra. Pollution problems were not the impetus for the
formation of IMCO despite the Organization's preeminent role in this field.
However, the threat to national and international interests posed by continental
shelf disasters persists. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 9. An oil platform in the Gulf of
Mexico caught fire and blazed out of control in late February 1969; killing the fire
only allowed more oil to spew unburned into the Gulf. TImE, March 23, 1970, at 41;
N.Y. Times, March 11, 1970, at 26, col. 1; id., March 14, 1970, at 62, cols. 7, 8. Since
1954, 25 blowouts have occurred on the shelf, of which 17 leaked gas only. Two resulted
in serious pollution incidents (e.g. Santa Barbara) and nine resulted in serious blow-
outs accounting for 9 fires and 29 deaths. ExEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PREs IDENT, OFFSHORE
MINERAL RESOUmCES, A CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY 3 (1969) (emphasis added].
It is projected that if development continues to expand at the current rate and the
frequency of accidents remains constant, "we can expect to have a major pollution
incident every year." Id. The magnitude of such relatively unpublicized statistics
bodes ill for a solution when one considers the halflife of public concern over the
most dramatic of incidents.
However, serious conceptual problems may confound an attempt to characterize an
oil rig as a "vessel" in order to obtain controls under some rubric of regulation of
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The right of the coastal state to act is qualified by procedural hurdles
and possible sanctions for improper conduct. Article III requires that
a state acting under Article I must, "before taking any measures,"
[emphasis added] consult with other states affected by the casualty,
"particularly... the flag State." It is also required to give notice of pro-
posed measures to other interested parties.31 Provision is made for consul-
tation with independent experts whose names are to be compiled by
IMCO (under Article IV, para. 1).32 Nevertheless, the right of an ag-
grieved nation to act in a bona fide crisis is unrestricted by these pro-
cedures:
In cases of extreme urgency requiring measures to be taken immediate-
ly, the coastal State may take measures rendered necessary by the
urgency of the situation, without prior notification or consultation or
without continuing consultations already begun . ... 3
"shipping." Nevertheless, in Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879 (1955), the United
States Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict awarding damages for injuries sustained
by a member of a drilling crew on an offshore rig, in effect treating him as a Jones
Act "seaman." The Court of Appeals had ruled in Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 22 F.2d.
382 (5th Cir. 1955) that treatment of complainant as a member of a crew of a vessel
merely because the jury said he was, was improper. The court relied on evidence that
"the vessel was not in navigation, nor was [plaintiff] aboard it in aid of navigation."
Id. at 387. The court intimated that its reasoning might not have been applicable
had the injury occurred while the platform was being moved under power into drilling
position. Arriving at the "drilling rig v. vessel" determination on the basis of whether
the platform is anchored and affixed to the seabed rather than in motion recalls the
property law chestnut that a fixture is "realty with a chattel past and the fear of a
chattel future." J. CASNER & W. LEACH, PROPERTY 469, n. 1 (1951). The Supreme
Court's ruling in the case may have turned merely on respect for the jury determina-
tion in a Jones Act case. See discussion and cases cited, H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAw OF
THE SUPREME COURT 180-91 (2d. ed. 1969). The likelihood of this cools the temptation
to import the case into the area of maritime liability for offshore oil operations. A
more serious problem is that, although the platform occasions the pollution in the
typical continental shelf case, it is not the source of it in the same sense that a tanker
is.
But see unpublished customs decision, ruling that the arrival of mobile oil rigs from
Europe at points outside the U.S. three-mile limit but above the submerged oil lands
did not constitute imports on the theory that:
mobile offshore drilling platforms even "during the period when they are
secured to or submerged onto the seabed . . ." are vessels within the meaning
of that term as defined [in the customs regulations.]
B. BrirKER 9- L. EBB, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND ]FOREIGN PER-
SONS 201 (1968).
The United States has called upon the U.N. to adopt curbs on pollution and dis-
turbances of biological, physical, and chemical balances in the regime of the deep ocean
floor. 59 DEP'T STATE BULL 554, 556 (1968). If the problem of pollution from the
continental shelf and deep seabed is undertaken under U.N. auspices, the agency as-
signed to the task should take heed of the vast accumulation of expertise in pollution
of the seas which presently resides uniquely in IMCO.
31. Public Law Convention, art. III (a), (b).
32. The experts are to be paid for services rendered by the state utilizing those
services. Public Law Convention, art. IV, para. 2.
33. Id., art. III (d).
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It may be expected that liberal use will be made of this "escape clause"
feature. Even under this procedure, the state must notify interested
states, avoid risk of human life, and abstain from interference with repa-
triation of the crew.3 4
The self-restraint promoted by these measures is further fostered by
the standard by which the protective measures are to be judged:
Measures taken by the coastal State in accordance with Article I shall
be proportionate to the damage actual or threatened to it.3
5
The measures taken are not to exceed what is reasonably necessary to
protect the interests defined in Article I.36 Overreaction to a pollution
crisis exposes the actor to sanctions:
Any Contracting Party which has taken measures in contravention of
the provisions of this Convention causing damage to others shall be
obliged to pay compensation.37
Nothing in the Convention is to deny other available remedies or to
prejudice any "otherwise applicable right, duty, privilege or immunity."38
Controversies are to be settled through procedures of negotiation between
the parties, conciliation, and ultimately, arbitration.
39
2. The Convention and Pre-existing International Law
As might be expected, authorities differ concerning the extent to
which the Public Law Convention represents a real change in pre-existing
law. One observes that:
[W]hile acceptance of [the Convention] will not notably advance the
rights of governments in pollution disaster situations, it will at least
codify the existing state of international law on the subject.40
However, it must be recalled that, traditionally, establishment and en-
forcement of anti-pollution measures have been vested in the state of the
34. Id., art. III (e).
35. Id., art. V.
36. The criteria of proportional response are:
(a) the extent and probability of imminent damage if those measures are not taken;
and
(b) the likelihood of thoe measures beinq effective: and
(c) the extent of the damage which may be caused by such measures.
Id.
The concepts of "necessity" and "proportionality" are limitations on the exercise of
the right of self-defense. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM" WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 242-43 (1961) ; Utton, supra note 19, 623-25.
37. Public Law Convention, art. VI. In the Corfu Channel case, despite Albanian
violation of international law in failing to warn of the existence of a minefield which
harmed British vessels, British employment of a minesweeping operation accompanied
by a naval demonstration was a non-innocent penetration of Albanian territorial
waters and an illegal display of force under international law. Corfu Channel Case,
[1949] I.C.J. Rep 4.
38. Public Law Convention, art. VII.
39. Id., art. VIII & Annex.
40. Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 28.
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ship's flag. The "equally strong claim" by the coastal state to exercise
concurrent jurisdiction has, nevertheless, gained support.41 Regardless
of whether Article I represents a major intrusion on established law of
the sea or merely a restatement of it,42 the consultation procedures and
sanctions for improper action are new developments.
In analyzing the effect of the Convention, customary and conventional
international law precedents will be examined to determine whether
they afford a basis for coastal state legislative and enforcement jurisdic-
tion on the high seas to combat pollution.
The chief difficulty with permitting such extensions of coastal state
authority is the potential impingement on freedom of the high seas. The
high seas are defined by the 1958 High Seas Convention43 as all parts
of the sea not included in territorial or internal waters. The exercise of
freedoms of the high seas, which include navigation, fishing, laying of
cable and pipelines, and flight over these seas, is not without qualifica-
tion.44 Article 10 imposes an obligation on every state to take measures
to comply with international standards, particularly with regard to safety
and seaworthiness of ships. 45
Outside the Convention:
the international community has long since evolved rudimentary rules
to ensure that the High Seas do not become a "legal vacuum", an area
of lawlessness beyond the jurisdiction of civilized states. 40
These rules include the right of states to exercise certain defensive pre-
rogatives on the high seas and may be analyzed in terms of three divisions
41. Nanda, supra note 19, at 406.
42. Some states have insisted that international action is necessary before a state may
be authorized to take such a move. However,
this cannot be the position of the British government and it seems incon-
ceivable that any coastal state would concede that such new treaty would be
de lege ferenda rather than de lege lata.
Sweeney, supra note 19, at 202-03.
Following the extraordinary IMCO session in 1967 after the Torrey Canyon incident,
the U.S. Congressional delegation to the meeting advocated legislation empowering
the President to take emergency action to forestall damage to U.S. shores in the event
of a tanker casualty. WATER CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 25, 1967, at 1. Implicit in the pro-
posal is the suggestion that such action would not violate international norms. In a
later report it was urged that the United States seek "[i]nternational concurrence with
the U.S. view that nations threatened by spills on the high seas can take immediate
protective measures. ... REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at 25 [emphasis added].
43. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 18, art. 1.
44. These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the inter-
ests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
Id., art. 2.
45. Id., art. 10.
46. D. BowEl-r, THE LAW OF THE SEA 44 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LAW oF TE SEA].
Restriction of freedom of the seas to ships flying a national flag is an example. Id. &
n.l. The universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy is another. Id. at 44; McDOUGAL
& BURKE 806-23; OPPENHEIM 608-17.
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of the sea: the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the remaining
high seas. It has often been asserted that the right of a state to take action
in its territorial waters to promulgate and enforce anti-pollution legisla-
tion is well-established.4 7 Two theories are advanced for this proposition.
One argues that the territorial sea is an integral part of the state's sover-
eignty. The other theory differentiates the territorial sea from the land
mass in that coastal state rights are qualified by the right of innocent
passage. 48 The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone 49 adopts the sovereignty approach, but the rights and duties
incident to innocent passage are carefully delineated. 50
Present state claims to territorial waters lack uniformity5' partly due
to the failure of the 1958 Conference to establish a precise limit.52 Thus,
the twelve mile contiguous zone specified by the Convention is a more
important area for resolving state claims to apply authority. 53 In this
zone,
47. Sweeney, supra note 19, at 201.
48. It could perhaps be argued that the coastal State exercises absolute sover-
eignty over its marginal sea on the plea that the latter forms a part of its own
territory .... However, . . . this sovereignty is always subject to the right of
innocent passage, hence the view . . . that the qualified sovereignty of the
coastal State is based on a right of jurisdiction rather than anything else ....
N. SINGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEIS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING 33 (107 Academie de
Droit International, Recuel des Cours 1962, 1963). Accord, CoLolImos 91.
49. Supra note 18.
50. Although art. 14 grants the right of innocent passage to all ships so long as that
passage is not "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security" of the coastal state,
art. 16 expressly authorizes the coastal state to prohibit passage which is not innocent.
Under art. 17, ships passing through the marginal sea must comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal state which are enacted in conformity with the Convention
and international law generally.
51. Article 1 states that the "sovereignty" of a state extends to a belt of sea "ad-
jacent to its coasts" but does not define the width of that belt. Articles 3-13 establish
with great precision the reference points to be used in the drawing of baselines from
which the as yet internationally undefined width of the sea is to be measured.
52. Claims differ for selected purposes: territorial sea, continental shelf, customs,
security, criminal jurisdiction, fishing, etc. See tables, SHIPPING CONVENTIONS 1152-57.
53. See generally Utton, supra note 19 at 618-22. The Torrey Canyon fell within the
contiguous zone defined by the Convention (see Text at note 61, infra). Utton, supra
at 619.
Prof. McDougal suggests that the territorial sea concept is superfluous - not even a
three-mile limit is sound. It is irrelevant militarily, has little relation to the habits
of fish, and serves only a "very petty minimum order" for customs, immigration, and
health. A very flexible contiguous zone should be favored over the arbitrary limits
of internal, territorial, and contiguous waters. The suggestion was made at the 1958
Conference that such zones were unnecessary in view of the broader right of self-defense.
However, Prof. McDougal suggests that the concept of self-defense with its require-
ments of necessity and proportionality is inferior to a contiguous zone concept which
demands only reasonableness. McDougal, International Law and the Law of the Sea,
in THE LAW oF THE SEA 3, at 20-21 (L. Alexander ed. 1967}.
Opposition to the contiguous zone in which only certain territorial rights may be
exercised claims that it would complicate the restrictions on the high seas already
created by claims to a territorial sea by "superimposing" on the distinction between
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the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sani-
tary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within
its territory or territorial sea.5 4
The rationale for the zone is that a state must be capable of exercising
an "occasional exclusive competence" in order to protect its territorial
sea and land mass.55 This occasional exercise of authority is to be strictly
construed with a view to preservation of general uses of the sea by other
parties. "[E]vidence of a consensus" that a state may so act is supplied
by the number and variety of national legislative enactments in this area
which are reciprocally honored by other states.56 The statutes typically
involve customs, revenue, sanitary and police regulations, and national
security.57 However, the failure of a number of maritime states to ratify
the 1958 Convention on the Contiguous Zone may lend importance to
resolution of the self-protection issue in the 1969 Convention.58
Any extension of coastal state rights beyond the territorial sea involves
a balancing of its interests against those of the rest of the international
community; thus the range of activity which the coastal state may regu-
late in the contiguous zone is broader than the sanctions which it may im-
pose. 59 The contiguous zone concept expressed in Article 24 has been
the high seas and territorial waters yet a third distinction. Thus, three regimes would
apply to "waters which are essentially the same," allegedly a "dangerous and difficult"
concept. COLOiuBOS 110-11. The flaw in the argument is that its rationale is equally
supportive of the McDougal position as its own. Simplicity might also be attained by
essentially abolishing the "rigid" lines separating the three zones in favor of an
"easement" of coastal state jurisdiction for certain purposes. Defining such rights func-
tionally rather than by area would better accord with reality than geographical line-
dawing.
54. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 18, art.
24.
55. It must be recognized, however, that there are certain exclusive interests, common
to all states, which may require exercise of unilateral protective measures in the con-
tiguous areas beyond the territorial sea. McDOUGAL & BURKE 578. The practice of
mutually honoring such claims has prevailed since "early times." Id.
56. McDOUGAL & BURKE 612. U.S. statutes: "Hovering Laws," 19 U.S.C. §§1581,
1584-87, 1594 (1964); 33 U.S.C. §3 (1964) (security); The Antismuggling Act, 19
U.S.C. §1701 (1964). See citations, McDOUGAL & BURKE, 579, n. 42, 612-13, nn. 144-56.
57. HARVARD RESEARCH, TERRITORIAL WATERS 333-34 (1929); McDOUGAL & BURKE
614-16.
58. Sweeney, supra note 19, at 207.
59. See Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea; What Was Accom-
plished, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 607, 624 (1958). It was probably the intent of the framers
of the 1958 Convention that the competence of the coastal state would be limited to
such "minor measures" as surveillance, inquiry, and search. McDOUGAL & BURKE 628.
The United States would have preferred a stronger position giving the
coastal state the power to punish activities within the contiguous zone which
had deleterious effects in the territory or territorial sea, even though the
offending vessel had never entered the territorial sea.
Dean, supra, at 624.
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criticized for its "rigid conceptualism" in favor of a more flexible zone.60
The counterargument is based on the alleged necessity of preventing an
ever-wider contiguous zone from being effectively incorporated into the
territorial sea.61 A preferable view emphasizes the utility of the zone as a
buffer area where a state may act to guard selected interests without the
all-encompassing extension of authority involved in a wider territorial
belt. This view is more consonant with the "free seas" principle.0 2
3. Jurisdiction On the High Seas
Whatever the degree of consensus on littoral state authority in a con-
tiguous zone, there is greater uneasiness about the application of
measures outside the zone. Nevertheless, there is support for such actions
in the objective territorial theory by which a state acquires jurisdiction
over acts outside its territory which have their effects within it.63 Another
way of describing this is "protective jurisdiction" over a threat to its
territory:
In certain circumstances the state cannot await the arrival of a danger
to its security within its own territorial jurisdiction but must take
measures to prevent that danger from materializing while still outside
its territorial jurisdiction. 64
The protective theory is analogous to self-defense. The great principle of
territorial integrity is vulnerable before the exercise of such a funda-
mental right.65 Certainly the "freedom of the seas" concept is of no
greater dignity and may be temporarily abridged in pursuit of self-
protection.
There is also a basis in customary law for "assumed jurisdiction" be-
yond the acknowledged bases of territoriality and nationality. 66 State
60. It was the United States which proposed the present "rigid" conception.
McDOUGAL & BuRKE 628, n. 204, at 628-29. Yet "[w]e are not living with such a limit; we
couldn't live with it! I don't know of any major state which could live with it."
McDOUGAL, supra note 53, at 20.
61. One who snaps at the minnow of a limited, occasional, exclusive authority in
a contiguous zone must, apparently, perforce swallow the whale of a compre-
hensive, continuing, exclusive competence in such zone.
McDOUGAL & BuRuE 629.
62. As a matter of fact, there is no impairment of [the freedom of the seas] ...
since instead of extending the zone of territorial waters for all purposes,
thus narrowing the high seas, it leaves the high seas area undiminished
though the littoral state may exercise certain special rights in the waters out-
side of, but adjacent to, the marginal sea.
HARVARD RESEARCH, TERRITORIAL WATERS 251 (1929).
63. W. BisHoP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 464-65 (2d ed. 1962); the Cutting incident, id.
459-61.
64. D. Bowm-r, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as BowETr].
65. P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 76 (1927).
66. Bowm-r, at 68-69.
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practice affords a number of such examples which would buttress a claim
to enforce anti-pollution measures at sea. The universal jurisdiction over
piracy jure gentium has already been noted.67 Although, in time of peace,
there is no right of visit and search on the high seas0 8 - merchant ves-
sels must not be so molested - there is a right of approach by warships
to determine whether a ship flies a flag and its nationality. 09
4. The Doctrine of "Abuse of Rights"
A more generic theory is that use of the high seas is subject to the
doctrine of "abuse of rights."70 A recent example of such an abuse is the
establishment of "pirate" radio stations aboard vessels or on platforms
outside the territorial seas of European nations for purposes of broad-
casting to audiences within those states without complying with their
67. Note 46 supra.
68. COLOMBOS 310-11.
69. Id. at 311.
70. LAW OF THE SEA 44, 45 (abuse of rights by oil pollution), 46-50 (pollution gen-
erally); OPPENHEIMi 34547.
There is general recognition of the idea that a state may not exercise "rights" in an
arbitrary manner so as to injure another state out of proportion to its own advantage.
OPPEINHEM 345. Since the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas applies to states
as well as individuals (Id. at 346), no state may alter the condition of its own territory
to injure another state. Id. 290-91. "Abuse of rights" is a fundamental principle of
civilized states which the I.C.J. may apply under art. 38 of the Statute of the Court,
although the precise limits of the doctrine are uncertain. Id. at 346-47.
"A State is bound to prevent such use of its territory as, having regard to the circum-
stances, is unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighboring state .. " Id. at 291[citing Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 33 Amr. J. INTL. L. 182 (1939), the leading in-
ternational air pollution case]. Canada-U.S. efforts to control cross-border pollution are
an example of bilateral international cooperation in the field. Jordan, Recent De-
velopments in International Environmental Pollution Control, 15 McGiLL L. J. 279.
(1969). As to other such efforts, see Livingston, Pollution Control: An International
Perspective, 10 SCIENTIST AND CITIZEN 172, 178-79 (1968).
Another example of international liability for permitting a usage of national terri-
tory to harm the interests of another state is the Corfu Channel case. The I.C.J. held
Albania responsible under international law for failure to warn of an automatic mine-
field emplaced in its territorial waters which severely damaged two British warships.
[1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 22; COLOIMBOS 133-34; OPPENHEIM 291.
The general concept of the sea as a res communis read together with the Trail Smelter
decision suggests an international law of nuisance. Reiff et al., A Symposium on the
Geneva Conventions and the Need for Future Modifications, in THE LAW OF THE SEA,
at 266-67 (L. Alexander ed. 1967); L. HYDEIMAN &A W. BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
OF NUCLEAR MARUrrISE AcTIvInEs 276-86 (1960, [hereinafter cited as HYDE,%[AN &
BERIMAN.] Although international decisions and treaties which oblige states to act "with
a decent respect for the ecologic opinions of mankind" have emerged piecemeal, inter-
national law may have a leading role to play, as in other fields, in fostering recognition
of freedom from pollution as a basic human right. Livingston, supra, at 177.
In support of a proposed 1972 U.N. Conference on the environment, the U.S. delegate
noted the universality of the problem:
Manmade pollution crosses every boundary, riding the wind and rain, the
rivers and ocean currents, the bodies of migrating fish and birds.
59 DEP'T STATE BuLL. at 709 (1968).
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licensing and other laws. State interests threatened by the practice in-
cluded stability of licensing requirements, copyright protection, and in-
ternational obligations regarding telecommunications7 1,
Measures employed to combat this broadcast "piracy" provide prece-
dents for extensions of state jurisdiction to the high seas. One method
was to extend beyond territorial waters the application of laws which
would otherwise be applicable to the stations were they are on national
territory. An expansion of the existing continental shelf jurisdiction
enabled states to regulate fixed platforms. However, in the case of ves-
sels, there was the possibility of opposition from the state of flag (often
a flag of convenience) .72 In one case, Britain went so far as to seize one
of the Thames platforms, an act dubbed "double piracy" by some, and
a precursor of her assault on the Torrey Canyon.73
5. The Fisheries Analogy
The issue of the protection of national interests on the high seas has
arisen sharply in the context of control of living resources. There have
been claims to extended jurisdiction or even an exclusive right of ex-
ploitation of fisheries on the high seas for:
[i] t is conceivable that an economic interest of this nature may be far
more vital and essential for a state's existence than its interest in the
inviolability of a portion of its territory. The question arises whether,
under the right of self-defense, a claim to jurisdiction and control over
fisheries on the High Seas may be maintained.74
The distinctions between this exercise of authority and territorial juris-
diction are so substantial that generally there is no acceptable basis for
prescribing authority for conservation of high seas fisheries. 75 However,
if these common resources were to be seriously abused to the detriment
of vital interests of a state, the jurisdictional base of self-protection might
well be invoked.
The United States advanced the theory of protection of vital interests
in high seas fishing in the Bering Sea Arbitration of 1893. Russia, which
71. LAw OF THE SEA 52-53; COLONIBOS 126-27.
72. However, Panama withdrew her registration from two ships broadcasting from
the Thames estuary. LAw OF THE SEA 53, n. 3. A treaty is now in force which requires
Contracting Parties to restrain such piracy by its nationals or by non-nationals on its
ships or aircraft. European Agreement for the Prevention of "Pirate" Broadcasts, art.
3, 59 Amr. J. INT'L L. 715 (1965), 4 INTrL LEG. MAT'Ls 116 (1965).
73. Pell, Preface to THE LAW OF THE SEA at vii (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
74. BowE-r, at 78.
75. Id.
Le droit de p&he appartient * tous les peuples. Nulle puissance ne saurait se
r~server d'une manire absolue et vis-A-vis de tous les Etats le monople de la
p~che dans aucune partie de la haute mer, .... aucune Etat ne peut 6dicter des
r~glements de p~che applicables aux sujets d'autres Etats.
1 FAucHmxL, TRArrE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 50 (1922) [quoted in Id.].
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had preceded the United States in title to Alaska, had claimed exclusive
sealing and fishing rights in the Sea, but after strong United States and
British protests the claim was renounced. The United States regulated
the pelagic seal fisheries through a series of laws in the late-nineteenth
century. Although basing part of its claim on a right of self-defense
applicable on the high seas, the United States also emphasized its
"property" interest in the seals which based themselves on United States
shores and its succession to the very Russian interests which it had earlier
sought to restrict. The Arbitration resulted in the freedom of the seas
principle winning out over the United States claims. 76 It has been inti-
mated that the decision may have turned on a finding that the United
States interests were "not of a sufficiently vital nature to support a plea
of self-defense .... 77 However, the United States emphasis on property
interest in the seals, based on their animus revertendi to the Alaskan
shore, may have been the fatal defect.78
The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the Sea 79 has given effect to the concept that a coastal state
may exercise nondiscriminatory regulatory control over foreign fishing
vessels for conservation purposes. Article 7 permits the application of
coastal state conservation measures "appropriate to any stock of fish or
other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its ter-
ritorial sea" where international agreement has not been reached. Machi-
nery for resolving disputes arising out of such action is provided in
Articles 9-11.
The criteria by which the reasonableness of measures taken are to be
judged include a "need for urgent application," a basis for the measures
in "appropriate scientific findings," and non-discrimination "in form or
in fact" against foreign fishermen. These criteria possess great relevance
to nuclear maritime activities "or to any other type of contiguous con-
trol."8 0 Similar standards could be incorporated in a permitted extension
of coastal jurisdiction within the 1954 zones of prohibition (as discussed
in the 1967 Senate hearings).81 This would be an appropriate basis of
agreement lacking an international enforcement body. Although states
which apply pollution legislation beyond three miles generally restrict
themselves to territorial waters as they define them, at least one authority
asserts that states may promulgate regulations for the waters beyond if
they can establish "a direct causal connection between discharges within
76. BowzrT 78-80; COLOMBOS 61; HYDEMAN & BERMAN 200-02; OPPENHJEIM 499-500.
77. Bow=r 80.
78. HYDEMAN & BERMAN, at 202, 208 n. 289.
79. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas done April 29, 1958 [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285 (effec-
tive March 20, 1966), art. 7.
80. HYDEMAN & BERMAN 208.
81. Note 18 supra.
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a particular area of those seas and damages sustained within adjacent
territorial limits."8 2
Enforcement provisions of fisheries conventions are a matter of in-
terest in drawing an analogy to pollution control. In several, the parties
have established reciprocal rights of arrest of offenders by patrol boats
of any party.8 3 An example is the Convention on Conduct of Fishing
Operations in the North Atlantic (done at London in 1967) which pro-
vides for a system of mutual inspection whereby enforcement officers of
contracting parties may observe and report on the activities of vessels
of any of the parties. Ships may be boarded if necessary and the authority
may be exercised "[o]utside national fishery limits."8 4 The Convention
also forbids dumping into the sea of any article or substance which would
interfere with fishing or damage fish, fishing gear, or vessels. Commenting
on the no-dumping provision in a message submitted to the President,
the Secretary of State wrote:
With the question of pollution of the sea becoming more and more
significant, this first step since the Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil adds to the international cooperative ap-
proach that is presently underway to cope with this problem area.8 5
The first step alluded to is an important one. It is a precedent that can
expand the role of national and international environmental control
authority into the pollution field as it has been developing in the fisheries
context.
6. The Impact of the Convention - An Evaluation
While the Public Law Convention may contribute a measure of cer-
tainty and orderliness to efforts to cope with a pollution disaster, steps
which might be taken prospectively by states in a Torrey Canyon situa-
tion seem reasonably well-grounded in current customary international
law. The Convention inspired little controversy and the permitted
coastal state authority was carefully hedged with restrictions. The dispute-
resolution procedures may be an important contribution. However, as
has been stated, the Convention does not grapple with the problem of
pollution from sources other than a "maritime casualty," an area of con-
siderable ambiguity.
Evidence that the coastal state's rights are not significantly expanded
may be gleaned from the Resolution on International Co-operation Con-
cerning Pollutants Other than Oil.86 That resolution recommended a
82. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 757-58 (2d. ed. 1945) [quoted in HYDEMAN & BERMAN
at 199].
83. LAw OF THE SEA, at 82.
84. 63 AMt. J. INT'L L. 808 (1969).
85. Id. [emphasis added].
86. 9 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 65 (1970).
Cornell International Law Journal/ Vol. 3, No. 2
subsequent convention to deal with the problem. In the interim, however,
the limitation of the Public Law Convention to oil "is not intended
to abridge any right of a coastal State to protect itself against pollution
by any other agent."87 This dictum by the Brussels conferees suggests, at
least implicitly, that such rights exist outside the Convention.88
B. THE CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION
1. Content
The purpose of the Convention is to establish "uniform international
rules and procedures" for determining questions of liability and com-
pensation. Definitions differ somewhat from the Public Law Convention
to reflect the distinct utilities of the second convention - for instance,
"ship" includes any "sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft actually
carrying oil in bulk as cargo."s 9 The Convention applies to "pollution
damage" in the territory or territorial sea of a Contracting Party. 00
Except where specifically exempted, the owner of a polluting vessel
"shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has
escaped or been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident."'"
Liability is without regard to fault; however, it is "strict" rather than
"absolute" in that the owner may be absolved by the intervention of cer-
tain extraordinary causes. 92 Claims are to be channeled through pro-
cedures prescribed by the Convention. Claims other than these may not
be brought. However, the owner is not denied an action outside the
87. Id.
88. An argument may be made on the model of the interpretation of art. 51
of the United Nations Charter which states that it is not lege ferenda with respect
to the right of self-defense. Although the Charter is much more explicit in that it
refers to the "inherent" right of self-defense, there is nonetheless a parallel. U.N.
CHARTER art. 51.
89. Civil Liability Convention, art. I, para. 1.
90. "Pollution damage" includes loss outside the ship resulting from the escape of
oil and includes preventive measures and "loss or damage caused by preventive
measures." Id., art. I, para. 6. This would include pollution by detergents used to
disperse the oil.
91. Id., art. III. "Incident" means "any occurrence, or series of occurrences having
the same origin, which causes pollution damage." Id., art. I, para. 8.
92. No liability attaches if the damage resulted from an "act of war ... or a natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character," an intentional
act or omission of a third party, or negligence or other wrongful act of an authority
responsible for aids to navigation. Id., art. III, para. 2.
There is also a "comparative contributory negligence" feature; if the shipowner can
establish that the damage resulted "wholly or partially" from the intentional act or
negligence of a pollution claimant, his liability to such claimant may be diminished
ratably. Id., art. III, para. 3.
The U.S. was successful in opposing inclusion of third-party negligence as an ex-
ception. CONFERENCE REPoRT 14.
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Convention against third parties. Liability is joint and several for the
escape of oil from two or more ships, as in a collision.93
A central feature of the Convention is the limitation of liability:
The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this
Convention in respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount of
[$135] for each ton of the ship's tonnage. However, this aggregate
amount shall not in any event exceed [$14 million.] 94
The limitation applies to strict liability and may not be availed of "[i] f
the incident occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the
owner . .."95 The owner may have the benefit of the limitation by con-
stituting a fund or an equivalent guaranty in the courts of a Contracting
State up to the applicable liability limit.96 Preventive measures, cleanup
efforts, and out-of-court compensation by the owner entitle him to subro-
gation rights against the fund. Third parties (e.g. governments, insurance
companies) may likewise be subrogated to the rights of claimants whom
they have paid.97
Under Article VI, no person may levy on other assets of the owner and
courts of Contracting States are to release property which has been ar-
rested or otherwise held as security for such a claim unless the claimant
did not have access to the fund. Owners of ships registered in the Con-
tracting States which carry more than 2000 tons of oil as bulk cargo must
maintain insurance or other financial security in an amount determined
by applying the Convention's liablity limits to the tonnage of the ship.
A certificate attesting that such financial responsibility has been pro-
vided is to be issued by the state of registration after a determination
of compliance.98
Under the terms of Article VII, a claim for pollution damage may be
93. Id., art. IV.
94. Id., art. V, para. 1. The C.M.L draft proposed a limitation of $67 per ton,
half of that finally agreed on. The higher figure resulted from a tradeoff of higher
limits sought by the U.S. delegation for the British delegation's proposals for the ex-
ceptions to absolute liability outlined in art. III, para. 2. Lord Devlin of the British
delegation, after a canvass of London insurance houses, notified the drafting com-
mittee that the amounts were insurable so long as the insurers were permitted to
plead certain defenses of the owner. Anglo-American "lobbying" for the compromise
led to its adoption. CONFERENcE REPORT 14-16.
The tonnage for limitation purposes is net tonnage plus engine room space. For
ships not measurable by normal rules, tonnage is to be deemed 40% of the weight in
tons of oil which the ship can carry. Id., art. 5, para. 10. In other words, the liability
limitation for each ton of potentially damaging oil cargo is actually only $54 in such
a case. See comparative table of dead weight tonnage (cargo capacity) and gross
registered tonnage for selected vessels in Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 10 n. 34, at 10-11.
95. Civil Liability Convention, art. V, para. 2.
96. Claimants are to participate in the fund pro rata. Id., art. V, para. 4.
97. Reasonable preventive measures voluntarily undertaken by the owner are com-
pensable as claims against the fund. Id., art. V, para. 8.
98. Id., art. VII, para. 2 and the Annex to the Convention specify the contents of
the certificate.
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lodged directly against the insurer who may then constitute the limited
liability fund. He may avail himself of the insured's defenses against the
claim and may plead that the damage resulted from the wilful miscon-
duct of the owner; however, he may neither invoke the bankruptcy or
winding up of the owner, nor defenses which he might have invoked
against the owner. The defendant-insurer is provided with a right of
compulsory joinder of the owner. Insurance coverage maintained to make
the showing of financial responsibility must be entirely reserved for the
satisfaction of pollution claims.99
Claims may be pressed in the courts of any Contracting Party in whose
territory or territorial waters damage has occurred or preventive measures
have been taken. Each state is to enable its courts to entertain such suits.
Once a fund is constituted, the courts of the state to which it has been
entrusted are deemed "exclusively competent" with regard to disburse-
ment among claimants. 100 A final judgment is enforceable in the courts
of the other Contracting Parties and is not to be reopened except on a
showing of fraud or denial of notice for an opportunity to be heard.10 '
The Convention imposes several stringent responsibilities on the Con-
tracting States to further ensure compliance with the Convention. A
signatory is not to permit a ship to trade under its flag unless it carries
a certificate of financial responsbility. More importantly, each Con-
tracting State is to ensure that, under its national legislation, financial
security up to the specified limits "is in force in respect of any ship,
wherever registered, entering or leaving a port in its territory, or arriving
at or leaving an offshore terminal in its territorial sea," if the ship is of
a type covered by the Convention. 102 Although the Convention excepts
warships and government ships on non-commercial service under Article
XI, para. 1, it makes state-owned commercial ships subject to suit under
Article XI, para 2; sovereign immunity of the state-owner is waived.
Although such ships are not required to carry the insurance certificate,
they are required to carry a certificate of state ownership, which is an
affidavit of that state's financial responsibility as a self-insurer up to the
limits contemplated by the Convention. 103
2. Limitation of Liability
The limitation of liability proposals put forth at Brussels were con-
troversial. They ranged from overall limits as high as $30,000,000 to a
retention of the status quo. 04 Due to the importance of insurance in
99. Id., art. VII, para. 9.
100. Id., art. IX.
101. Id., art. X.
102. Id., art. VII, para. 11.
103. Id., art. VII, para. 12.
104. CONFERENCE REPORT 13-16, see Sweeney, supra note 19, at 205.
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underwriting maritime liability, it has been the limitation of liability
rather than the standard of care, which has been of greatest concern to
shipowners.
Modern proposals for liability limits urged by shipowners are usually
based on the limits incorporated in the International Convention Re-
lating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships done at
Brussels in 1957.105 The Convention provides that a shipowner may
limit his liability to $67 per ton for property damage and $207 per ton
for personal claims.106
The $67 per ton limitation has been frequently advanced by shipping
interests in reference to currently pending U.S. oil pollution legisla-
tion and in discussions leading up to the 1969 Brussels Conference.
Although one House bill in the 90th Congress embraced the $67 amount,
current congressional proposals have ranged from $100 to $450 per gross
registered ton with overall limits from $10 to $15 million.107 Grounds of
opposition to the higher limits were that:
(1) The limitation of liability provisions of the bills are tantamount
to no limitation at all.
(2) The costs of insurance in view of the exorbitant maximum ex-
posure would be an unbearable burden on the merchant marine.
0 8
In 1967, a representative of companies owning more than half of the
privately-owned vessels in the United States merchant fleet, testified to
the rationality of a liability limitation. All maritime nations, it was said,
maintained such limitations, and the economic burdens of a United
States standard which recognized no limitation or an excessively high
limitation would hasten the already rather drastic decline of the United
States merchant fleet vis-a-vis those of other nations.109 It was added that
the "paramount objective" of maintenance of uniformity in enacting
maritime legislation would be served by United States accession to the
1957 Convention. 10
105. SHIPPING CONVENTIONS 1058.
106. 1957 Brussels Convention, arts. 1, 3 in SHIPPING CONVENTIONS 1059-60. Distribu-
tion is to be made in proportion to claims established. Id., art. 3, para. 2.
107. S.7 and S. 544, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 4148, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969).
See discussion of bills before the 91st Congress in Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 9-10.
Senate and House conferees agreed upon a compromise measure applying the Senate-
passed standard of strict liability and its overall liability limitation of $14 million
but adjusted the limits per ton downward to the House-passed $100. N.Y. Times, March
4, 1970, at 1, col. 1 & at 26, col. 3 (city ed.). The bill passed the House without a
dispenting vote and was sent to the President. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1970, at 21,
col. 4. (city ed.). The discrepancy between the $100 per gross registered ton limitation
and the $135 figure adopted at Brussels apparently did not figure in consideration of
the measure.
108. Statement of the representative of the Maritime Law Association, Water Pollu-
tion - 1969, at 123.
109. In 1950, there were 1,206 ships in the U.S. merchant fleet as opposed to 905
in 1969. "By comparison, Norway has over 1,600 ships." Id. at 124.
110. Id. at 125.
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Shippers contended that the higher limits of liability - $450 per ton
and $15 million overall - were unrealistic in that "not in one's wildest
imagination" could damage actually reach $15 million. Evidence that the
respective limits were excessive consisted largely of records of amounts of
oil spilled in earlier incidents and cleanup costs. 1 '
Despite these claims, the Federal Water Pollution Control Agency, sup-
plied the Senate with data which would comport with a higher limita-
tions:
[W]e are discussing the upper limit of liability which a vessel owner
might incur in the event of a catastrophic spill of oil. Obviously, this
upper limit, if it is to be meaningful, must be set high enough to
cover the cost of the cleanup in all but the most extreme cases. 12
The Commission's study indicated that, in major incidents such as the
Torrey Canyon and the Ocean Eagle as well as in several less catastrophic
spills, the cleanup cost approximated $1.00 per gallon of oil which
actually escaped at sea. For Torrey Canyon and Ocean Eagle, the figures
were $.70 and $1.00 respectively. Costs for other accidents have ranged
from $1.00 to $5.00 per gallon. Relating the average ratio of cargo capacity
to gross registered tonnage, it was illustrated that $450 per gross regis-
tered ton would provide $1.00 per gallon for the costs of cleanup efforts
for tankers of relatively standard design."13
3. The Insurability Problem
The heart of the shipowners' objection did not seem to be that the
extremes of liability could not be overreached in any event, but that such
an occurrence would be highly unusual. Notwithstanding the rarity of
such an occurrence, no prudent owner could afford to eschew extensive
insurance coverage even in the absence of international or domestic
compulsion. Insurance for the higher amounts is allegedly flatly unavail-
able and lesser limits, if in excess of the 1957 Convention limitations,
would mean prohibitive increases in premiums reducing severely the
already strained profit margins of the small operators.14
In a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee,
the American Institute of Marine Underwriters indicated limits of in-
surability as follows:
(1) If the basis of liability is negligence (including the doctrine of
reversal of burden of proof), the probable insurable limit available in
the world market would be in the area of $100 per gross registered
ton or $10,000,000 each accident each vessel, whichever amount proves
to be the lesser.
111. Id. at 115-19.
112. Id. at 116.
113. Id.
114. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1969, §5, at 25, col. 1.
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(2) If the doctrine of absolute liability were enforced, the probable
maximum world market would be in the area of $67 per gross regis-
tered ton or 55,000,000 each accident each vessel, again whichever
amount is the lesser.115
The brokers also felt that permitting a direct action against the insurer
would negate any possibility of insurance on such vessels.116
British underwriters insuring the bulk of the world's shipping tonnage
told the committee that the proposed legislation would lead to "un-
insurable liabilities and possibly chaos in shipping."117 At least one
British fleet owner advised that his ships would be effectively prohibited
by the legislation from calling at United States ports. A memorandum
of the Tanker Committee of the International Chamber of Shipping con-
cluded that underwriters will not insure where there is unlimited lia-
bility for negligence, where non-fault liabilities are "unrealistic," and
there is an "unqualified right of direct action against the insurer." ' s The
Civil Liability Convention seems to have deferred somewhat to these
considerations in opting for lower liability limits and permitting a
limited range of defenses against a direct action brought against the in-
surer. The views of the London insurers are critical in that their houses
provide vital backup for American firms. The industry practice of re-
distributing risk among additional companies, known as "reinsurance,"
requires an evaluation of the entire world capacity for risk bearing."19
The insurance brokers market survey indicated that the largest
coverage available was for the "$100 a ton or $10 million, whichever is
less" formula. 20 Even this would result in a substantial increase in the
premium increment of the cost of doing business, already 15 per cent
of carriers' operating costs. The representative of the United States fleet
of unsubsidized merchant vessels claimed that they would be "decimated"
by the proposal. 12 '
4. Means of Financing Cleanup Costs and Compensation
In a possible move to head off congressional and international con-
vergence on high liability limits, the major oil tanker owners developed
115. Letter from American Institute of Marine Underwriters to the Honorable
Jennings Randolph, Chm'n, Sen. Comm. on Public Works, Aug. 18, 1969, at 2.
116. Id.
117. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1969, at 93, col. 1.
118. Id.
119. See Water Pollution - 1969, at 153.
120. N.Y. Times, supra note 114.
121. The insurance would cost American carriers between $.35 and $.75 per ton, two
to five times the rates available to foreign shipowners. Id. A comparison of premiums
indicated that an American shipper and a foreign shipper, each owning 10 vessels of
20,000 gross registered tons would pay $750,000 and $60,000 respectively. Water Pollu-
tion - 1969, at 158.
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a private voluntary insurance scheme to compensate governments for
cleanup efforts and to encourage owners and operators to take remedial
measures. 122 Known initially as the Tankers Owners Voluntary Agree-
ment Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution or TOVALOP (now the
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation), the agreement
provided for reimbursement by a Bermuda-based indemnity association
of costs to an injured country up to $100 per ton or $10 million (which-
ever is less) .123 Insurability of these amounts would belie the shippers
earlier representations about market capacity but for the fact that
TOVALOP indemnity was to be based on fault whereas some earlier
estimates were based on strict liability. TOVALOP's adherence to a fault
standard is its major weakness. Nevertheless, IMCO's sounding of the
London market prior to confirmation of the final figures in the Civil
Liability Convention of $135 per ton and $14 million overall suggests
that some insurability fears were chimerical. Adherence to the $67 per
ton figure seems to have little to support it except coincidence with the
1957 Convention. However, the drafters of the Brussels convention
might take a different view in the light of subsequent marine disasters
which have gone beyond the experience at that time.
The marine insurance system may, in fact, be based on archaic con-
cepts. The purpose of marine insurance heretofore has been to protect
ship and cargo owners against financial loss due to destruction of hull
and cargo and to indemnify personal injury claims, not to protect third
parties damaged by the cargo or escaping fuel. For example, the Torrey
Canyon carried hull insurance of $16 million - however, this amount
was of no benefit to the shoreowners who suffered economic loss. 12 4
Viewed in this light, the statements of the shipping industry that the
current insurance system will not bear the cost of the extremely high
liabilities created by oil spills may be accurate. However, it will not suf-
fice to leave it at that. If the maritime industry is to continue to expand
122. N.Y. Times, supra note 114.
123. Water Pollution - 1969, at 257-65; Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 7-9; CIuIEMIcl.
WEEK, Nov. 16, 1968, at 81; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, at 93, col. 1; id., Sept. 25, 1969,
at 4, col. 7; id., Nov. 7, 1969, at 93, col. 1.
124. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1967, at 1, col. 7. The owners of the Torrey Canyon
settled suits for cleanup costs by Britain and France for $7.2 million shortly before
the Brussels meeting. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1969, at 66, col. 1. Claims against the
vessel were said to have been in excess of $16 million. Sweeney, supra note 19, at 163
n. 43. Liability based on a $67/dead weight ton figure considered by an IMCO subcom-
mittee would have been $9,450,000. Id. It was said at the conclusion of the 1969 con-
ference that liability for the Torrey Canyon would have been more than double the
private settlement under the Civil Liability Convention. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1969,
at 66, col. 1. This appears to be an erroneous estimate, possibly based on a computation
using the vessel's deadweight tonnage of 120,890 d.w.t. (Sweeney, supra, at 158). On the
basis of a gross tonnage of 61,000 (Sweeney, supra, at 157), the liability would be
only $8,235,000 under the Convention. See note 94 supra.
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its technology to encompass new methods of transport which pose a
threat to the environment, new means must be devised to insure losses.
This problem was confronted and more satisfactorily dealt with in the
airline industry where potential per accident liability may well outstrip
any that has yet occurred at sea.' 25
One proposal for reforming the insurance system was to provide re-
duced premiums for tankers sailing sealanes where the risk of pollution
was limited.126 Ships would have an incentive to sail the safe, low-liability
routes involving low premiums. Once established, the system would serve
as an incentive to companies to reduce premium costs by investment in
research and development to reduce the probability of casualties and the
seriousness of the effects. 2 7 If economic incentives failed, mandatory sea-
lanes with increased liability for noncompliance might be established
under a supervisory agency.128
The new tanker technology should pay its own way. Since the potential
damage which a tanker may cause increases markedly once it exceeds a
critical size, it would be just to reallocate the benefit of the resulting
low cost of oil to those who suffer pollution losses. The economies of
scale realizable through use of large tankships should redound in part
to these parties through the use of expanded liability insurance coverage
with a premium pool large enough to cover any estimated damage.12 9
If this open-ended liability proved too onerous for private firms to under-
write, some form of government reinsurance might be provided.
Imaginative research must be devoted to development of equitable
premium devices that will provide a large enough pool to underwrite
losses without crippling the smaller operator whose contribution to pollu-
tion may be marginal. Perhaps other forms of insurance - automobile or
health -would suggest schemes for accomplishing this. Provisions for
deductible amounts for operators who use small vessels or structural de-
sign limiting damage, rebates for a good "health" history of vessel or
125. See Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 15-18. See also the extensive liability pro-
visions of the Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 57 Am. J. INT'L
L. 268 (1963) ; COLOMBOS 355-57.
126. It was suggested that a private, governmental, or international agency develop
a "liability profile" of tankship routes through a scientific and economic survey of
the world's coastlines and make a specific valuation of the potential contamination
damage which could result from accidents involving ships carrying dangerous cargoes.
Route plans would have to be submitted which would provide adequate distances from
coasts to minimize pollution. This proposal accords with other suggestions of inter-
national agreement on mandatory sealanes for supertankers and is a logical extension
of the negative requirements of the 1954 prohibited zones. Liability premiums would
be based on the degree of adherence to routes which involved least jeopardy to coastal
interests. Water Pollution - 1967, at 250-55.
127. .d., at 252-53.
128. Id., at 255.
129. Id., at 251.
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captain, and sliding-scale premiums for jumbo vessels are possibilities.
The incremental cost of insurance should increase with size. This would
meet the argument that the independents would be driven from the
oceans. The large oil companies which formed TOVALOP not only
account for the largest percentage of overall tanker tonnage but have
a heavy investment in the "supertankers" which are most likely to test the
upper margins of any liability systema 0 Certainly increased transporta-
tion costs must figure in their business planning. Yet these companies are
in business to profit from the production, refinement, and sale of oil, not
its transportation; it is less onerous to impose greater standards of fi-
nancial responsibility on them than on the independents. Further, such a
move would encourage some efforts currently being made in the direction
of improved tanker design and safety, or, in the alternative, impose
outside limits on continually burgeoning tanker sizes if, in fact, safety and
cleanup technology cannot keep step.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the patient efforts of IMCO from the Torrey Canyon to
Brussels have borne fruit, the 1969 Conference has left much to be done.
For instance, the failure to include non-oil substances is a disappoint-
ment; the delay inherent in separate action on the matter may prove
costly.13 An organic reorganization in IMCO would be necessary to en-
able it to deal with non-maritime sources of pollution such as seabed
exploitation, noxious substances carried by river effluents, and dumping
of wastes at sea.132 A new United Nations agency which could deal with
pollution generically would be preferable to clouding the heretofore
exclusively maritime functions of IMCO.
Within the world of pollution from ships, IMCO should endorse
stricter standards13 and take on greater authority. It would be visionary,
130. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1969, at 93, col. 1; Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 27 n. 88.
131. The U.S. warned that adoption of the Public Law Convention might be fol-
lowed shortly by a disaster involving a "noxious chemical solvent." N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1969, at 93, col. 2. The more cautious approach taken at Brussels leaves the world
"one convention behind each maritime disaster." Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 30. The
drafting committee felt that it lacked the "technical competence" to compile a list
of substances. CONFERENcE REPORT at 7. Yet the IMCO has dealt exhaustively with the
problem vis-a-vis cargo. IMCO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS CODE
(1965) (covering inflammable liquids and solids, corrosives, poisons, etc.).
132. E.g. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1970, at 33, col. 4 (city ed. ("dead sea" created by
dumping sewage sludge from N.Y. City in international waters); id. June 29, 1969, §5,
at 12, col. 1 (Rhine River insecticide poisoning; dumping of 1,700 nerve gas "coffins"
150 miles off U.S. coast).
133. The 1969 amendments to the 1954 Convention still do not totally prohibit dis-
charge of oily wastes so long as dilution standards are met. 12 U.S.T. 2989, 17 U.S.T.
1523, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1 (1970).
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however, to suggest that the Organization be immediately changed from
a non-coercive consultative body to an International Coast Guard with
enforcement power. Short of this, there is a broader role for IMCO to
play, perhaps as an objective fact-finding or investigatory body.134 For
example, why not draw the services of the "experts" as provided in
Articles III (c) and IV of the Public Law Convention directly from full-
time personnel of IMCO? IMCO, with its expertise, could then recom-
mend coastal state action.
An altered IMCO structure could be of use in supporting coastal state
anti-pollution measures without directly involving a U.N. agency in
policing violations. In the absence of international enforcement, ex-
tension of coastal state authority to contiguous zones, perhaps as
broad as the 1954 prohibited zones, would be an interim step. IMCO
scientific and technical observors on U.N. or national ships or aircraft
would lend objectivity to the determination of a violation, and thus
mitigate the impact of unilateral coastal state jurisdiction in so broad an
area.
The International Fund proposal slated for further study by IMCO
offers great promise as a backup for private insurance coverage. 135
Ideally, the Fund could be used to compensate claimants even if the
source of pollution were unknown; however, this would require near-
universal adherence to the system to prevent exploitation by non-mem-
bers.
This raises the problem of state responsibility for pollution by vessels
of its registry. A state may eschew participation in international agree-
ments or adhere to them with important reservations, may be lax in
enforcement of treaty provisions, or, in the absence of a treaty commit-
ment, may permit safety and other standards that fall below accepted
international norms. We have seen that a state is responsible for injury to
another state by its nationals even though the offenders are not instru-
mentalities of the state.' 36 State passivity, where there is a duty to act, is
also liability-creating conduct.' 37 International law recognizes a certain
134. The agency could participate in research and development of methods of detec-
tion and perhaps supply detection experts to states on an ad hoc basis.
See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1969, at 15, col. 3 ("fingerprinting" tankers with chemicals
which enable spilled oil to be traced); id., Nov. 6, 1969, at 47, col. 3 (British Mail
Lines indicted for violation of 1954 Convention after an expert determined from
aerial photographs that the oil mixture exceeded permissible limits).
135. There are several possibilities for financing such a fund: a pool of insurance
premiums (text at note 129 supra), a charge on the carriage of oil by sea (Mendelsohn,
supra note 25, at 27), and a levy on extraction of oil from the seabed (Note, supra note
19, at 128). The State of Maine has enacted a levy on import and export of oil
through its deepwater ports to be used to finance pollution control. TmE, Feb. 16,
1970, at 52.
136. Trail Smelter arbitration, supra note 70.
137. Corfu Channel case, id.
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unity of ship with state notwithstanding the decline of the "floating
island" concept.'3 8 In view of the "genuine link" idea embodied in the
High Seas Convention, perhaps it is time for a reversal or modification of
the 1960 International Court of Justice opinion in the Maritime Safety
Committee case' 39 which upheld the concept that a state's voice in inter-
national maritime matters was to be determined by the tonnage of ships
of its registry. 40 Although to date flag-state authority has not fostered
"jurisdictional anarchy,"' 41 the success of international pollution con-
trol agreements should not be hostage to the adherence by a few key
"flag of convenience" states. The nations which have the greatest stake in
pollution control are those whose nationals own or operate vessels and
those which are most exposed to pollution. They must lead international
energies toward a solution.
138. The S.S. "Lotus" 1935 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10, COMMnos 286-88, 304-06.
There may be a reverse-Lotus argument - a state which sends out a ship under
its flag which it has sought to immunize from the internatonal legal order would be
as responsible for resulting harm as if the wrong had been occasioned by a deleterious
use of national territory.
139. Note 9 supra.
140. Traditional adherence to flag-state hegemony in this sphere is a rather per-
verse "one-ship-one-vote" philosophy. The "Panlibhon" (Panama, Liberia, Honduras;
13 N. SINGH & R. COuNVAUX; supra note 7, at 7) states are thus vested with authority
that outweighs legitimate interest.
141. Comment, supra note 17, at 331.
